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Abstract 
Sharing the world’s largest freshwater lake system, Canada and United States seek for over a 
hundred years to jointly manage this vital resource. However, in accordance with multi-level 
governance and paradiplomacy literature, it appears that this collaboration has considerably 
changed over the last thirty years. From an initial bilateral cooperation between federal 
authorities, provinces and US states became prominent actors in cross-border water 
governance, and, in this sense, a green transboundary paradiplomacy has emerged along the 
49th parallel. In particular, a specific cross-border organization, the Council of Great Lakes 
Governors, developed an interesting water regime, and adopted recently a dual tool for water 
governance in 2005, called the “Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
Compact” and its non-binding twin the “Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable 
Resources Agreement”, which aim to prevent massive water transfer outside the basin. Adopting 
a green paradiplomacy and multi-level governance perspective, this paper aims to analyze in 
depth this new environmental regime and the legislative implementation process of this dual 
agreement. Then, we will begin a broader reflection on cross-border and subnational 
environmental governance in North America. 
 
Partageant le plus important bassin d’eau douce de la planète, le Canada et les Etats-Unis 
cherchent depuis plus de cent ans à gérer conjointement cette ressource vitale. Toutefois, 
conformément à la littérature sur la gouvernance à paliers multiples et sur la paradiplomatie, il 
apparaît que cette collaboration s’est considérablement transformée depuis les trente dernières 
années. D’une coopération initialement bilatérale entre les autorités fédérales, les provinces et 
États américains sont devenus des acteurs proéminents dans cette gouvernance 
transfrontalière, et une paradiplomatie verte et transfrontalière a émergé le long du 49e parallèle. 
Notamment, une organisation transfrontalière, le Conseil des Gouverneurs des Grands Lacs, a 
développé un régime de gouvernance de l’eau particulier, qui cherche à prévenir les transferts 
massifs d’eau à l’extérieur du bassin versant. Adoptant une approche basée sur la gouvernance 
à paliers multiples et sur la paradiplomatie verte, ce papier analyse en profondeur ce nouveau 
régime environnemental et la mise en œuvre législative de cette double entente. Par la suite, 
nous ferons une réflexion plus large sur les relations transfrontalières environnementales au 
niveau subétatique en Amérique du Nord. 
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Introduction 
Sharing the world’s largest freshwater lake system, Canada and the United States have sought 
for over a hundred years to jointly manage this vital resource. This vast ecosystem is 
fundamental for economic, social and environmental reasons, as a population of 40 million 
people depend on this ecosystem to work and live. While threats such as diversion, withdrawal 
and pollution have been the source of cross-border collaboration between the two nations for 
over a century, it appears that this collaboration has considerably changed in the last thirty years 
(Bielecki, 2006 ; Paquerot, 2007 ; Parrish, 2006). In fact, a new phenomenon that we called 
“green paradiplomacy” has grown considerably in North America (Chaloux et Paquin, 2012). 
Canadian provinces and US states became more and more involved in environmental 
protection, and have undertaken many actions internationally and regionally to deal with such 
issues (Blatter, Ingram et Doughman, 2001 ; Bulkeley, 2005). Some federated states have 
grouped together bilaterally or multilaterally to set up various environmental regulation tools, 
such as action plans and crossborder agreements, and water management has been one of the 
most prolific paradiplomatic fields in this regard (Chaloux, 2009, 2010 ; Norman et Bakker, 
2009). States and provinces have become promoters of regional cross-border environmental 
agreements, and have developed cooperative transboundary relations over a variety of 
environmental issues, such as acid rain, mercury, climate change and water management 
issues (Chaloux, 2009, 2010 ; Selin et Vandeveer, 2009). For instance, a study conducted by 
Norman and Bakker showed the increasing number of paradiplomatic instruments adopted by 
substate actors to manage transboundary waters over the past decades in North America (2009, 
p. 105). 
 
More specifically concerning water management issues, the growing importance of green 
paradiplomacy was accompanied by a new integrated water governance approach from a cross-
border perspective, called the “watershed approach,” which favoured a reconfiguration of 
authority over water issues in North America. The Great Lakes region has been particularly 
active in this regard, adopting numerous agreements recognizing this water management 
approach (Emerson, 2008 ; Gerlak, 2005 ; McGinnis, 1999 ; Norman et Bakker, 2009 ; Paquerot, 
2007 ; Vannijnatten, 2006), which was already a cornerstone in water management within 
several states and provinces. One particular organization, the Council of Great Lakes 
Governors, included this watershed-based approach in its reflections and, as such, it has 
included Quebec and Ontario in the organization in order to deal in a more integrated way with 
the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence watershed (Québec, 2011). After the adoption of the Great 
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Lakes Charter in 1985, several paradiplomatic tools were developed by this cross-border 
organization. The latest is the “Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Resources 
Agreement,” adopted in 2005, which aims to prevent massive water transfer outside the basin.  
 
However, despite the growth of paradiplomatic instruments to protect the environment, the 
literature tells us little about the development of such paradiplomatic agreements on 
environmental issues, and more specifically on water management issues between Canada and 
the United States at the subnational level (Bruyninckx, Happaerts et Van den Brande, 2012 ; 
Chaloux, 2010 ; Criekemans, 2010 ; Emerson, 2008 ; Gattinger et Hale, 2010). This article aims 
to respond to a certain gap in the literature by developing a descriptive analysis focusing on a 
particular case study, the Council of Great Lakes Governors and its most recent agreement, the 
“Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Resources Agreement.” The article begins 
with a review of the literature concerning the paradiplomatic phenomenon related to the 
environmental field in North America. The article then focuses more specifically on cross-border 
and water management issues. Next, the article seeks to analyze the context of the Great Lakes 
– St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Resources Agreement’s adoption, and the legislative 
implementation process. Finally, we begin a larger reflection on green paradiplomacy and new 
possibilities of transboundary environmental governance in North America. 
1. “Green paradiplomacy” in North America 
The recognition of environmental issues and threats essentially became a subject of public 
concern in North America in the 1970s. Since that period, all levels of government have 
developed substantive policies around environmental issues, such as acid rain, mercury, water 
quality, forestry, and more recently climate change issues. In North America, because of the 
federal nature of the political systems of Canada and the United States, federated states 
became prominent actors in the regulation of the environment. The constitutional powers 
attributed to states and provinces enabled them to assume a certain leadership over several 
environmental issues, and gave them an opportunity to develop cooperation and collaboration 
over cross-border environmental issues (Chaloux, 2009, 2010 ; Selin et Vandeveer, 2009 ; 
Vannijnatten, 2004, 2006). In fact, North American federated states became more and more 
active internationally, developing a strong green paradiplomacy on several issues. The present 
section draws a portrait of this phenomenon that is still underestimated in conventional 
international relations literature.  
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1.1.  Paradiplomacy and Multi-Level Governance 
Today virtually all government activity (at all level) falls within the purview of at least one 
intergovernmental organization or negotiation, and frequently many more. Education, public 
health, cultural diversity, business subsidies, the treatment accorded to investors, the removal of 
non-tariff barriers, the liberalization of agricultural trade, the issue of government procurement 
and of course the environment are on the agendas of international organizations, summit or 
bilateral meetings. As the international policy agenda has expanded, subnational governments 
have become increasingly aware that their political power and sovereignty, or, in other words, 
their ability to formulate and implement policy, are subject to negotiation in multilateral forums 
but also in transborder relations negotiations. Thus, there has been a noticeable increase in the 
number of subnational governments that are interested, and active, in international affairs and 
this, since the 1960s (Nossal, Paquin et Roussel, 2010 ; Paquin, 2004).  
 
Such international activities of non-central governments are generally called paradiplomacy – in 
the sense that it occurs alongside the diplomacy of central governments (Paquin, 2004, Aldecoa 
et Keating, 1999 ; Michelmann et Soldatos, 1990). It has been a growing global phenomenon, 
and one that involves not only the non-central governments, like the province of Ontario or 
Québec, in federations, but also the municipal governments of ‘world’ or ‘global’ cities such as 
Montréal, New York, Paris and Shanghai. In this context, the international activities of substate 
actors must be put into a broader global perspective and we must recognize that the 
paradiplomacy of non-central governments is extensive and diversified. Some substate actors 
enjoy considerable autonomy in the development of their international policies. They also devote 
considerable resources to paradiplomacy – sometimes even more than some sovereign states 
devote to their diplomacy. Also, they have more and more influence not only concerning global 
politics, but also concerning the definition of the central government’s international policy 
(Nossal, Roussel, Paquin, 2010, Paquin, 2004). 
 
As international actors, subnational governments have certain advantages over the national 
government. These benefits come from their ambiguous status, which is, in the words of James 
Rosenau, both ‘sovereignty-bound’ and ‘sovereignty-free’ (1990, p. 36). Their sovereignty-bound 
status within a nation-state allows the provinces to have access to federal decision-makers, 
including those who make international policies for the central government. Thus, unlike NGOs 
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and other civil society actors, subnational actors enjoy privileged access to the diplomatic 
networks, including international organizations, and negotiating forums available to the national 
government. It is now common for subnational officials to speak on behalf of the national state in 
international forums, or to participate in the drafting of international agreements when the subject 
matter falls within their constitutional jurisdiction (Paquin, 2005, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, subnational actors also enjoy a ‘sovereignty-free’ status in global politics. 
Since they are not recognized as sovereign in their own right, they are able to act more freely 
than the nation-state. In that sense, subnational actors enjoy some of the benefits associated 
with NGOs. It is easier for them to adopt idealistic positions, and they have more latitude to take 
firm positions on sensitive subjects, for example, condemning human rights violations or 
concerning climate change issues. In contrast, the national-state must always adopt a more 
nuanced and a more diplomatic approach on such issues since it cannot ignore the constraints 
of coalition politics or the effects its policies have on the nation-state’s political or commercial 
interests (Paquin, 2005).  
 
The ranges of tools available to the subnational actors in their international activities are almost 
as wide as those available to the central government in its diplomacy – with the obvious 
exception of the use of force. Many provinces have offices or ‘mini-embassies’ abroad that 
develop bilateral or multilateral relations with both sovereign governments and other non-central 
governments, including the creation of institutions of regional and trans-regional cooperation. 
Subnational officials are routinely included in national delegations (for example, the Canadian 
provinces are included in the Canadian delegation for the negotiation of a comprehensive free 
trade agreement between Canada and the European Union) and maintain relations with other 
international institutions such as UNESCO, the World Health Organization, the European Union 
and the World Trade Organization. Substate actors send missions abroad, and they participate 
in trade fairs and in private international forums such as the World Economic Forum in Davos. 
They also finance public relations campaigns to promote exports and attract foreign investment. 
Also, they host official visits from leaders of other governments. Some subnational governments 
even have a minister, and for that matter a ministry, responsible for external relations, as in the 
case of Quebec (Paquin, 2004). 
 
However, subnational actors also face a number of constraints. Usually, because they are not 
recognized as international actors under international law, they have to negotiate with the 
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national government about the terms of some of their international activities, such as official 
missions to foreign countries or participation in international negotiations. Most subnational 
governments, with the notable exception of Belgian subnational governments, cannot sign real 
binding agreements under international law. For instance, the government of Quebec has signed 
more than 700 “ententes internationales” or “memoranda of understanding” since the 1960’s – 
and a majority of them with sovereign states-, but these agreements have no binding force in 
international law.  
 
The rise of regional governments and of subnational paradiplomacy certainly has had a big 
impact on multi-level governance. Decisions taken at one level of government directly affect 
decisions of the other level of government. Most policies therefore require some form of 
coordination among international, national, regional and even local governments. The concept of 
multi-level governance was created within the framework of the European Union in order to 
explain the relation between the various levels of government in EU policy making (Marks, 
1992). Multi-level governance means that there are multiple actors from various levels of 
government interacting to negotiate and implement public policy coming from the EU. The multi-
level governance approach illuminates the interdependence between the local, regional, national 
and international levels of authority (Bache et Flinders, 2004).  
 
If, at first, multi-level governance was developed as a way to study the European Union, it is now 
applied in various situations because, as we already stated, these days, virtually all government 
activities are affected by the jurisdiction of at least one intergovernmental negotiation, and 
frequently many more. This phenomenon is magnified in Europe by the process of European 
integration and in North America by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Bache 
et Flinders, 2004).  It can also be used to explain transborder relations over green issues. 
 
1.2. Evolution of North American Green Paradiplomacy 
Why are green issues taking a larger place in the subnational governments’ agenda and public 
policies? Several reasons may explain this expansion. First, subnational and municipal 
governments are generally the principal actors involved in public transportation, urban planning, 
health, energy and natural resources policies. Gordon’s article, also published in this issue, 
echoed to this green paradiplomatic phenomenon, when he mentions the parallel paths and new 
modes of governance developed by subnational actors because of the inefficiency of the 
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international climate regime (Gordon, 2013). Furthermore, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) has recognized a key role for local governments, federated states or sub-
national jurisdictions in the fight against global warming, stating that "most investments to reduce 
GHG emissions and adapt to climate change - 50 to 80 percent for mitigation (...) take place at 
the subnational and local levels" (UNDP, 2011, p. 3). And more globally, since environmental 
issues are increasingly complex and go beyond territorial boundaries, green paradiplomacy has 
become a new trend for federated states and municipalities, and legitimizes their international 
action over environmental issues.  
 
It was mainly around the beginning of 1960s and 1970s that cross-border environmental issues 
became a matter of concern and were brought to public attention in North America. At that time, 
environmental problems affected larger territories than before, and their effects were observed in 
an undifferentiated way across state borders (Karkkainen, 2008 ; Wolf, 1997). Thus, to regulate 
these larger environmental issues, strong cooperation became necessary between all levels of 
governments, redefining traditional modes of governance to assume a cross-border multi-level 
governance perspective (Bruyninckx, Happaerts et Van den Brande, 2012, p. 6 ; Chaloux et 
Paquin, 2012 ; Norman et Bakker, 2009, p. 102). 
 
Nevertheless, cross-border green paradiplomacy is not a recent phenomenon, even if public 
concern over this issue is quite recent. A study concerning cross-border interactions between 
Canada-US substate actors, published in 1976, identified more then 700 formal and informal 
interactions, of which 29% were related to environmental protection or natural resources 
(Vannijnatten, 2006). Today, even though bilateral green paradiplomacy has been observed all 
along the Canadian-US border, it is mostly in a multilateral perspective that green paradiplomacy 
has been developed in North America. In fact, cross-border relations have widened and 
deepened as a result of an institutionalization of cross-border relations within multilateral 
organizations such as the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian 
Premiers (NEG-ECP), the Council of Great Lakes Governors (CGLG), the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI) and several other organizations present along the 49th parallel (Chaloux, 2009 ; 
Chaloux et Séguin, 2012 ; Vannijnatten, 2006).  
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2. Environmental transboundary issues and the case of water 
A transboundary issue of great interest in environmental studies concerns water management. 
While a large part of the literature focuses on the study of geopolitical tensions surrounding the 
issue of transboundary waters (Assouline et Assouline, 2009 ; Descroix et Lasserre, 2003 ; 
Galland, 2008 ; Ghiotti, 2006 ; Victor, 2011), another field of study has been developed in the 
literature around a new form of cross-border governance called the “watershed-based approach” 
(Bédard, 2004 ; Blatter, Ingram et Doughman, 2001 ; Hall, 2006 ; Norman et Bakker, 2009). In 
fact, according to McGinnis, this particular approach “provides one of the best units for 
intergovernmental management” (1999, p. 498). It is besides with this approach that federated 
states have developed a rich cooperation in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin, as 
this basin is one of the world’s largest watersheds, containing in itself nearly 20% of the fresh 
water on the planet. 
 
To better understand the complexity and the challenges of the Great Lakes water regime – and 
in corollary the challenges of a watershed approach – certain facts need to be kept in mind. 
Firstly, 95% of the US fresh surface water is contained in this specific watershed, and 
approximately 40 million people on both sides of the border rely on this basin for their water 
consumption (Hall, 2006, p. 414-415). Moreover, only one percent of all this water is renewed 
naturally each year within the basin, which enhances the importance of the concepts of 
sustainable use and return flow. These facts alone support the importance attached to the study 
of the management of this hydrographic basin, from an environmental and economic 
perspective. Secondly, on a political level, the region (with some exceptions, which will be 
detailed later) is committed to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 adopted by both federal 
governments. Nevertheless, there is a sharing of responsibilities with all federated states 
covered by the watershed, including eight US States (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New York) and two Canadian Provinces (Ontario and Quebec), 
and also with all local governments and municipalities sitting along the basin, which increases 
the complexity of governance of the water resources (Bielecki, 2006 ; Chaloux, 2010 ; Hall, 2006 
; Norman et Bakker, 2009). And thirdly, the management of this resource involves much more 
than solely the environmental perspective. The Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River basin 
management is also related to navigation, tourism, energy, fisheries, agriculture and industries, 
which necessitates a collaborative attitude from each (contradictory and even conflicting) interest 
(Bielecki, 2006). In short, the common will to enhance water quality and protect the Great Lakes 
– St. Lawrence River Basin is conditioned and complicated by the multiplicity of interests, actors 
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and institutions in the region. This section therefore reviews the principal aspects of water 
management in this area in order to facilitate comprehension of our case study, which will be 
analyzed in Section 3 (the case of the Council of Great Lakes Governors and the Great Lakes – 
St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement). 
 
2.1. Federalism and Water Management 
As with many other environmental issues, water management jurisdiction is not assigned solely 
to a specific level of government in Canada or in the United States. Indeed, because water 
governance is an expansive concept, over time there have been some shifts between the actors, 
both domestic and transboundary, involved in water management (Gerlak, 2005 ; Norman et 
Bakker, 2010). The inclusion of a watershed-based approach has reconfigured how water 
management could be considered by stakeholders and has helped to shed light on this 
environmental regime, mostly developed by federated states, around this particular basin. This 
section explores the evolution of the distribution of authority in Canada and in the United States 
around that issue, and also explains the development of green paradiplomacy between the 
states and provinces surrounding the basin.  
2.1.1. The United States 
In the United States, the division of powers related to environmental issues is highly fragmented, 
due to the fact that the U.S. Constitution has remained silent on the distribution of environmental 
jurisdiction. For Denise Scheberle, “[d]ebates over the appropriate scope and division of power, 
responsibilities, and authority among the federal and states governments are certainly not over, 
and especially not for environmental federalism” (Scherberle, 2004). In fact, different 
centralization/decentralization trends have characterized US environmental policies since the 
beginning of US history. However, according to some authors, the nature of current 
environmental issues impacted on the distribution of authority over environmental issues, 
centralizing the authority with the federal government over the states (Fitzgerald, 1996 ; Knigge 
et Bausch, 2006, p. 7-8). Nevertheless, the traditional decentralized nature of the United States 
has increased the importance of state legislation and policies over environmental issues 
(Parrish, 2006). Michael Kraft stated, “an estimated 70 percent of all important environmental 
legislation enacted by the states is done on their own initiative, not under federal policy 
requirements” (Kraft, 2004, p. 90). 
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Concretely, federal powers related to the environment come under the federal government’s 
commerce clause (the purpose of this clause is to ensure national minimum standards and to 
avoid unfair competition by one state over other states), spending and taxing clause (Art. 1 sec. 
8), supremacy clause, and power to make treaties (Fitzgerald, 1996). Even if this latter power 
limits the ability of states to enter into international treaties, according to Knigge and Bausch: 
“[c]ertainly states can pass laws committing themselves to meet the provisions of a particular 
treaty, but such laws are not binding under international law” (2006, p. 7). In fact, this does not 
restrict the development of green paradiplomacy, but it necessitates a higher degree of trust and 
reciprocity in the development of environmental regimes. Finally, states keep residual powers 
granted under the 10th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.   
 
If we look closely at water governance issues, it appears that since the 1990s, there is a 
stronger cooperation between federal and states authorities. According to Gerlak: 
“Today’s federalism is pragmatic, emphasizing collaborative partnerships, relying on 
adaptable management strategies with a focus that is problem and process oriented. In 
some ways, it more closely resembles the cooperative federalism or partnership ideal of 
shared power and decision making. […] It promises greater accessibility to environmental 
and more local interests. It is holistic within a watershed or problem area and attempts 
integration of water quality and quantity concerns. Of course, pragmatic federalism is not 
without concern. Ultimately, its real test will be its ability to solve a particular watershed’s 
ecological problems and better coordinate stakeholders and program activities, thereby 
overcoming the policy fragmentation that has become all too common in U.S. water 
policy” (2005, p. 248). 
2.1.2. Canada 
Water governance is very fragmented in Canada, as in the United States. The Canadian 
Constitution gives the federal government the power to adopt laws related to navigation, 
international waters and fisheries, as well as more general responsibilities such as trade and 
commerce, POGG, criminal law, and interprovincial commerce. On the other hand, provincial 
powers directly related to water cover natural resources, water supply, public health, property 
and civil rights, and some other more general matters. However, there are certainly overlapping 
responsibilities concerning these constitutional powers and other general constitutional powers 
indirectly affecting water governance (such as agriculture, trade and commerce, and capacity to 
negotiate an international treaty, etc.) between the federal and provincial levels (Norman et 
Bakker, 2010 ; Tremblay-McCaig, 2008). According to some experts, this fragmentation “of 
federal and provincial laws in Canada [has] led to confusion over appropriate roles and scales of 
responsibility” (Norman et Bakker, 2010, p. 196), and is not immune to tension between different 
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levels of government. Nevertheless, to some experts, water governance in Canada appears to 
be one of the most decentralized in the world (Hill & al., 2008, p. 316; Parrish, 2006) 
 
In fact, in the specific case of water management in the Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River basin, 
the will of devolution from the federal government gave room for provinces to develop more 
comprehensive and specific water governance with their neighbouring US partners, recognizing 
the importance of a more general watershed-based approach to enhance the quality of the 
shared resource between the two countries. As well, the deployment of paradiplomatic 
strategies, of which Quebec is a fervent advocate, has legitimized these international activities 
through the Council of Great Lakes Governors, and the further adoption of the Great Lakes – St. 
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Resources Agreement in 2005. 
 
In summary, it appears that the evolution of both Canadian and US political systems leaves 
room to manoeuvre in a transboundary paradiplomatic and multi-level perspective to enhance 
water management taking a watershed approach. 
 
2.2. Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint Commission 
The understanding of transboundary waters governance in North America necessitates a review 
of the Boundary Waters Treaty (BWT) of 1909 and its International Joint Commission (IJC). 
Trying to provide a first tool for joint cooperation along transboundary waters, and trying to avoid 
future confrontation over water issues, the BWT aims to prevent and resolve disputes regarding 
quality and quantity of shared water resources. Setting several obligations, the BWT’s main 
focus is to avoid water withdrawal and diversion, protect boundary waters from pollution and 
institute a formal, independent quasi-judicial commission with equal representation (three 
commissioners from each side of the border). The BWT and the IJC have served as 
cornerstones of cross-border water governance between Canada and the United States for over 
a century (Durfee et Shamir, 2006 ; Karkkainen, 2008 ; Parrish, 2006).  
 
Despite the great influence of the IJC in water governance between Canada and the United 
States over the years, certain dimensions were left out of the BWT, such as legitimizing substate 
cross-border relations and agreements over water issues. In particular, the BWT has a restricted 
view of shared water, limiting boundary waters solely to  
“the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting 
waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the 
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United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and inlets 
thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow into 
such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters flowing from such lakes, rivers, and 
waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing across the boundary” (Boundary Waters 
Treaty, 1909). 
 
This definition excludes several sections on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin, such 
as Lake Michigan (entirely on the US side), the hundreds of tributaries, and ground water 
(Bielecki, 2006 ; Hall, 2006 ; Paquerot, 2007 ; Toope et Brunnee, 1998). Moreover, the new 
mode of water governance since the 1980s, based on the watershed approach, seeks to focus 
more on the ecosystemic boundary of a watershed than on political boundaries, and in this 
perspective, the Boundary Waters Treaty is considered more as a “territorial trap” in water 
governance (Karkkainen, 2008, p. 1584). Therefore, according to Noah Hall, “the narrow scope 
of the Boundary Waters Treaty and the political limitations on the International Joint Commission 
necessitate additional protections and management programs for Great Lakes water resources 
on both sides of the international border” (2006, p. 418). Thus, the enhanced participation of 
states and provinces in water governance in the Great Lakes region is part of the answer to 
water governance, and is also the result of a reconfiguration of authority from the traditional 
state-centric approach to a multi-level governance approach based on the importance of 
substate and non-state actors in international environmental governance.  
3. The case of the Council of Great Lakes Governors and the Great Lakes – St. Lawrence 
River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement 
As mentioned above, despite the establishment of a bi-national cooperative mechanism to deal 
with transboundary water issues, states and provinces quickly recognized the significance of a 
cooperative and multilateral approach at the substate level to deal with water quality and 
quantity over the entire basin. Nonetheless, on the US side, the recognition of a cross-border 
binding initiative was much harder, as article I section 10 and article II section 2 of the 
Constitution clearly prohibit states from adopting any binding agreement with any other state (in 
a compact1) or with a foreign government without the consent of the US Congress. Thus, any 
bilateral or multilateral agreement at the substate level needs Congressional consent to achieve 
full force and effect. So, the first Great Lakes Basin Compact was not enacted until 1968, 
despite the fact that the agreement was negotiated twenty years earlier by states and provinces, 
                                                        
1 An interstate compact (art. 1 sec. 10) is a legally binding agreement between two or more US states that 
requires the consent of Congress.  
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and more importantly, the Congress refused to include Ontario and Quebec in the initial compact 
as official parties (Hall, 2006, p. 423).  
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, US states and Canadian provinces continued to cooperate. In 
1983 they created the Council of Great Lakes Governors (CGLG) (hereafter the Council), where 
initially Quebec and Ontario participated only on an issue-specific basis (Hill, 1989). Then, the 
Council adopted, jointly with Quebec and Ontario, the Great Lakes Charter in 1985. This 
agreement marked an anchor point in the cooperation among all states and provinces 
concerned by this watershed. The Great Lakes Charter clearly focused on a watershed 
perspective, and on an interconnected water system (Bielecki, 2006 ; Valiante, 2005). In fact, all 
stakeholders agreed to individual commitments, with the aim to 
conserve the levels and flows of the Great Lakes and their tributary and connecting 
waters; to protect and conserve the environmental balance of the Great Lakes Basin 
ecosystem; to provide for cooperative programs and management of the water resources 
of the Great Lakes Basin by the signatory States and Provinces; to make secure and 
protect present developments within the region; and to provide a secure foundation for 
future investment and development within the region (Council of Great Lakes Governors, 
1985). 
 
Despite the voluntary nature of this agreement, and its weaknesses in the implementation, 
federated states nevertheless laid the foundations of a large cross-border cooperation at the 
subnational level. They institutionalized the cooperation by establishing a consultative process 
on the management of a common resource, based on particular consumptive uses or diversion 
of water (Hall, 2006; Bielecki, 2006; Bédard, 2004, pp. 140-141). Then, in 1997, Quebec and 
Ontario officially became associate members of the organization (Québec, 2011). 
 
Other agreements were annexed to the Charter in the following years, and then, in 2005, the 
Council adopted a compact and an agreement concerning explicitly massive water transfer in 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin. The Council became the secretariat of these 
agreements. The next sections will analyse the negotiations surrounding the compact and the 
agreement and then the legislative implementation process. 
 
3.1. Negotiations through the Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable 
Water Resources Agreement  
Several concerns about possible massive water transfer in the late 1990s led the Council of 
Great Lakes Governors to seriously consider developing new paradiplomatic tools enabling them 
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to respond to these fears and increase their leeway in managing the watershed. So, in 2001 
premiers and governors adopted an Annex to the Great Lakes Charter, and then in 2005 they 
adopted a basin-wide agreement.  
 
Recognized as “an important attempt to develop for the first time a comprehensive water 
management regime that is coordinated among the ten Basin jurisdictions” (Valiante, 2005, p. 
526), the adoption of Annex 2001 of the Great Lakes Charter was an important moment in the 
foundation of a water management regime for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin. In 
fact, states and provinces agreed to develop a new binding agreement to enhance the 
sustainable protection of the waters of the basin. Moreover, there was a common will to develop 
common water protection standards along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River Basin 
(Council of Great Lakes Governors, 2001). In December 2005, after the release of two drafts 
(July 2004; June 2005) and several modifications, premiers and governors approved the final 
text of the agreements (Bielecki, 2006).  
 
Interestingly, the Council approved two specific agreements, creating a dual structure of 
governance for the basin. First, a compact, between the eight states, was negotiated. The 
relevant jurisdictions then had to officially adopt it through their legislative assembly. All states 
approved the text no later than July 2008 (Council of Great Lakes Governors, 2011). Once 
completed, the compact needed Congressional approval (Hall, 2006, p. 411), which was 
obtained and entered into force in October 2008. To include their Canadian partners, the Council 
also adopted a good faith agreement, modeled on the US compact. 
3.1.1. The Compact 
Officially known as the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, this 
regional binding agreement was created for two main reasons. First, in order to prevent free-
riding related to the protection of shared water resources, the compact creates obligations for 
each stakeholder, and “it is one of the few instruments that can adequately provide for regional 
stability and uniformity in decision making” (Bielecki, 2006, p. 498). Indeed, many scholars have 
shown the weaknesses of previous good faith agreements related to water protection and water 
management issues in the region (Bielecki, 2006 ; Hall, 2006 ; Hill, 1989 ; Paquerot, 2007 ; 
Valiante, 2005). The adoption of the new compact then gave Great Lakes states the opportunity 
to enforce their collective control over the Great Lakes basin. The other main reason for the 
choice of an interstate compact relates to the common will to increase the states’ leading role 
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with respect to water management issues over that of the federal government. In fact, according 
to Hall, the Council wanted to avoid the possibility of federal government using the dormant 
commerce clause to permit water diversion outside the basin or outside the riparian states (Hall, 
2006), and therefore, “the goal was to keep diversion authority within the Basin” (Bielecki, 2006, 
p. 202). The best way to achieve this goal was to adopt an interstate compact and to promote 
cooperative horizontal federalism:  
While cooperative horizontal federalism does not preempt or prevent 
congressional action, it makes it politically less likely. Congress would need to 
overturn the express and collective legislative will of an entire region, something 
that has never occurred in the history of interstate water management compacts 
(Hall, 2006, p. 451). 
 
In short, the clear will to enhance water management in a cross-border perspective pushed US 
states to adopt an interstate binding agreement. Nevertheless, to achieve the ultimate watershed 
approach goal, stakeholders also had to adopt a good faith agreement with Canadian provinces, 
which was done in parallel with the compact negotiations. 
3.1.2. And the international non-binding agreement 
The cross-border challenge related to embracing an ecosystemic view to dealing with water 
governance pushed states and provinces to negotiate an additional good faith agreement with all 
members of the Council of Great Lakes Governors. Modeled on the compact, the Great Lakes – 
St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Resources Agreement presents some innovations, in 
terms of transboundary relations, but also some risks in multi-level governance and cross-border 
paradiplomacy in North America.  
 
Actually, Congress’s opposition to including provinces as Parties to an interstate compact is not 
recent, as mentioned previously. The only way to develop cross-border collaboration over water 
issues was by including provinces in transboundary organizations, and also by adopting good-
faith agreements. These paradiplomatic means have been used for several decades, and it 
seems that the deep-seated collaboration of Great Lakes states, Ontario and Quebec increased 
the internalization of common norms, ideas and values by stakeholders, and helped to converge 
toward a regime where stakeholders act voluntarily and deliberately for a common good 
(Genest, 2008 ; La Branche, 2003). Thus, the simplest way to attain this objective was by 
creating this dual structure of governance. 
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Nevertheless, and in addition to the general risk of free riding often mentioned in the literature, 
other risks are associated with the adoption of this particular non-binding agreement. One of the 
most important weaknesses stems from the inability of the Canadian provinces to use US 
federal legislation (the compact) to protect their interests (Paquerot, 2007). And according to the 
terms of this non-binding agreement, US states can change the process without the consent of 
the Canadian provinces. Also, Paquerot highlighted the fact that Quebec and Ontario represent 
more than 40% of the population living in the basin, but their voice is represented by just two of 
the ten actors (2007,  p. 74). Consequently, to overcome these weaknesses, great confidence in 
all stakeholders is required, but it is not impossible to achieve. 
 
3.2. The legislative implementation of the agreement 
As mentioned earlier, in 2005, the eight US border states of the Great Lakes basin, as well as 
Quebec and Ontario, adopted the Great Lakes St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water 
Resources Agreement. The purpose of this agreement was clear: to avoid massive transfer of 
water outside the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River basin. To do this, the ten states and 
provinces needed to incorporate the provisions into domestic law and meet the agreements’ 
objectives. 
 
What is the progress in this regard? On the Canadian side, both Ontario and Quebec have 
adopted legislation ensuring the sustainable protection of water in the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence River. In 2007, Ontario enacted the Act to amend the Ontario Water Resources Act to 
safeguard and sustain Ontario’s water, which implements the cross-border agreement of 2005, 
prohibiting specifically the diversion of water outside the Great Lakes basin and limiting the 
possibility of inter-basin water transfers (Ontario, 2007). Quebec followed with the adoption of a 
similar act in 2009, which affirmed the collective nature of water resources and provided stronger 
water resource protection (Québec, 2009). On the US side, as mentioned earlier, states adopted 
the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, which became law in 
2008 (2011). 
 
Therefore, even if we assume that the integration into domestic law by all states and provinces – 
and the corollary commitment to this cross-border agreement is only the first step in the 
elaboration of an environmental regime, it still signifies a clear will of each stakeholder to comply 
with the new water governance regime in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River basin. The 
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next years will be crucial to assess the effectiveness and robustness of this cross-border 
watershed regime to meet the challenges associated with a coordinated water management in a 
context of growing scarcity of the resource, climate change and economic growth. 
4. Conclusion 
The creation of a watershed-based regime to protect and preserve the water resources of the 
Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River basin represents a promising avenue in the development of 
transboundary green paradiplomacy in other riparian states in North America and all over the 
world. The analysis of this case study raises several considerations for paradiplomacy and multi-
level governance scholars, as the management of transboundary water requires a different 
involvement of stakeholders, and especially the development of trust and reciprocity that goes 
beyond difficulties from conventional political boundaries. 
 
The need to develop a common instrument to regulate water management issues in the Great 
Lakes - St. Lawrence River Basin is not a new phenomenon, as this paper revealed. In fact, 
since the adoption of the Great Lakes Charter in 1985, states and provinces have recognized 
the necessity for stronger instruments to enhance water quality and prevent water diversion and 
withdrawal from this cross-border watershed. Indeed, the adoption of the two simultaneous 
agreements clearly illustrates that fact, but also reveals the political and legal challenges of the 
cross-border agreement. The easiest way to achieve the common goal was by creating a dual 
structure of governance, which commits to a legally binding structure eight of the ten 
stakeholders involved in water governance of this watershed. To do this, all US states bordering 
the watershed had to adopt a regional compact, pledging them to an interstate agreement. Then, 
another non-binding agreement was also adopted, this time including Ontario and Quebec in the 
regime, giving them certain procedural powers in the Regional Body of governance. The dual 
agreements allowed federated states to transcend the constitutional limits and to propose a 
regional agreement based on common interests (Parrish, 2006). Finally, the good faith 
agreement gave the opportunity to create a regime that goes beyond the traditional idea of 
command and control towards a holistic view of transboundary cooperation.  In addition, it went 
further than a mere good faith agreement, in order to optimize the achievement of common 
goals (recognizing the benefits of a certain constraint in the development of a water governance 
regime), and the adoption of a compact is revealing in this regard. 
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Regarding the reconfiguration of water governance, some authors have also argued that there 
has been a transfer of authority from international bodies (i.e. the IJC) to the sub-state level 
(Parrish, 2006). In accordance with multi-level governance and paradiplomacy literature, there is 
a need to reconsider the role of federal authorities with regard to environmental issues. 
According to Karkkainen, central states would not be the best entities to meet the environmental 
challenges:  
Maybe, to put it starkly, a contractual agreement between two sovereign states is not the 
kind of instrument-and not the right kind of institutional arrangement-that can actually DO 
something as complex and multidimensional as an "ecosystem approach to 
management," especially at this large, basin-wide, regional scale, and most especially 
given the extraordinarily complex suite of resources and stressors that comprise the 
system” (2008, p. 1584).  
 
Therefore, this case study confirms the need for a broader perspective in studies on cross-
border environmental governance, as subnational governments become more and more 
involved in sustainable development policies, and as several environmental issues directly affect 
their constitutional powers. For these reasons, “a major reorientation of governmental activities 
at all levels is essential. […] (and) governance does not imply a shrinking, but a shifting role for 
governments” (Bruyninckx, Happaerts et Van den Brande, 2012, p. 5). 
 
In sum, environmental issues have given stakeholders and scholars an opportunity to reconsider 
certain modes of governance and to propose new possibilities in cross-border relations at 
subnational levels in North America. The fact that in this particular case study, at a legislative 
level, all stakeholders integrated into domestic law the provisions of the agreement leads us to 
believe that they have a genuine desire to implement the objectives of this agreement. 
Nevertheless, more broadly, further studies on the implementation process of such agreements 
are necessary. For instance, paradiplomacy could analyze whether the development of 
agreements within environmental regimes at the state level is sufficient to promote cooperation 
and achieve common goals, and what are the necessary conditions for this type of agreement to 
be implemented effectively by all stakeholders.  
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